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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the Government of Colombia’s (GOC’s) demobilization of 
the paramilitary organizations known collectively as the Auto-defensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) and the re-insertion of its fighters into Colombian society.  So far, this 
DDR process has not achieved the majority its goals, while other problems loom on the 
horizon.  The thesis addresses the implications for Colombia and makes 
recommendations for future DDR processes.  The study divides the process into two 
elements: the agreement between the AUC and the GOC, and the implementation of the 
terms of the agreement.   The contract between the two parties is found in Colombian 
Law 782 of 2002 and 975 of 2005, better known as the Peace and Justice Law.  The 
Ministry of Justice and of Interior is responsible for implementing the terms found in 
these laws.   
A central argument of this thesis is that, in order for the GOC successfully to 
carry out DDR of the AUC, it must not only contend with current and former paramilitary 
members, but must also address the societal problems that permit illegal armed groups to 
thrive in Colombia.  Success in Colombia must be matched in the international 
community which must perceive the DDR process as legitimate.  In short, if the public 
perceives penalties as being too lenient, the process will be de-legitimized.  If penalties 
are perceived as being too harsh by the former paramilitary members, or the Paras, they 
will likely stop participating and reconstitute their former organizations.  In order to 
prevent either of these pitfalls, the GOC must develop a formula that gains control over 
former AUC controlled terrain and its population, essentially extending government 
control throughout the country.   This is the only way to prevent both de-legitimization of 
the process and former paramilitary members from reconstituting their organizations.  If 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Historically, Colombia has struggled with multiple problems, which include 
social conflict, weak institutions, corruption, and an absence of government presence in 
much of the country.  Small wonder that illegally armed groups (IAGs) have proliferated 
in that country, a situation exacerbated since the 1980s by the expansion of coca farming.  
In short, for the past 40 years, Colombia has been engaged in a civil war, one that pits the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) against left-wing insurgents, right-wing paramilitaries, 
and powerful criminal organizations.  The disarming, demobilizing and reintegration 
(DDR) of these groups by the GOC is nothing new.  Prior to the period known as La 
Violencia, a time period marked with intense violence (1948-1958), amnesty was the 
most common form of reconciliation following civil wars and uprisings.1  Following that 
period, negotiations resulted in very complex settlements.  Logically, as groups who 
opposed the state became better organized and more ideologically aligned, the terms of 
negotiations became more complex.  The first comprehensive post La Violencia attempt 
to demobilize IAGs took place in the 1970’s by Colombian presidents Alfonso Lopez 
Michelsen (1974-1978) and Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982).  Both attempted but 
failed to bring guerillas to the peace table.  Their successor, Colombian President 
Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) convinced the country’s four major IAGs -- The Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia -  Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP), the Ejercito 
Popular de Liberation (EPL), the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), and the Autodefensa 
Obrera (ADO) -- to sign truces.   Although these agreements eventually fell apart, the 
Betancur administration’s negotiations laid the foundation that later led to the 
demobilization of seven IAGs -- M-19 (March 1990), Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores (PRT) (August 1990), Comands Ernesto Rojas, EPL (August 1990), 
Movamiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL) (March 1991), Corriente de Renovacion 
Socialista (CRS) (December 1993), Frente Francisco Garnica (June 1994), and the 
Movimiento Independiente Revolucionario-Comandos Armados (MIR-COAR) (January 
1997).  The agreements evolved over time, each one more complex than its predecessor,                                                  
1  Geoff Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI Books, 2004), 384, p. 41-42. 
2eventually leading to the current attempt to DDR the Auto-defensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC, the group’s Spanish acronym) or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.   
The AUC was formally established in 1997.  It grew out of the United Self-
Defense Forces of Cordoba, a smaller organization created in 1994, when block 
commanders realized that coordinating activities could reap more profits.2  The AUC was 
considered an “umbrella organization” that coordinated activities between the local and 
regional paramilitary organizations of a sort that have existed throughout Colombia for 
forty years or more.3  Historically in Colombia, paramiltary organizations countered the 
left wing insurgent groups in areas of the country where the GOC had no presence or 
influence.  Essentially, this was an effort to protect large ranches and villages from 
guerilla incursions and maintain the status quo.  This idea to arm civilians was actually 
sanctioned in 1965 by decree 3398 as part of a counterguerilla strategy that the GOC first 
initiated during the 1960’s and revived in the 1990’s.4  In fact, many Colombian Military 
counter insurgency manuals that were issued throughout the 1960’s, directed military 
intelligence untis to establish civilian structured paramilitary units in combat zones.5  
Unfortunately, these groups have evolved into one of the most violent actors in 
Colombia’s brutal internal war, targeting civilians and guerillas alike.  They have 
committed many of Colombia’s worst atrocities and are responsible for killing large 
numbers of demobilized guerillas.6  Since the 1980’s, the AUC has actively participated 
in Colombia’s multi-billion dollar drug trade and while at the same time coordinating 
                                                 
2  José E. Arvelo, "International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia: Balancing Peace and 
Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process," Georgetown Journal of International Law 37, no. 2 
(Winter, 2006), 411, http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com .libproxy.nps.navy.mil 
/pqdweb?did=1046725131&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD, p 4. 
3  Constanza Vieira, "Colombia: Uribe Orders Paramilitaries to Turn Themselves in," Global 
Information Network (August 21, 2006), http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1101979061&Fmt=7 
&clientId =65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed August 29, 2006). 
4  "The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobilization Or Legalization?" Amnesty International, 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR230192005?open&of=ENG-COL (accessed February, 12, 
2007), p 3. 
5  Ibid, p 3. 
6  Steven S. Dudley, Walking Ghosts : Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 253, p 76. 
3directly with the Colombian Armed Forces in counter guerilla operations.7  For this 
reason, Colombian President Alvero Uribe has made AUC DDR a top priority.  He 
understands that before the FARC-EP, the ELN, or any other guerilla group will consider 
demobilizing, the AUC must be dissolved.  In short, the first step to solving Colombia’s 
lingering internal armed conflict is to remove the AUC.  This fact makes the current DDR 
process’s success essential to restoring peace and order to Colombia.    
 
B.  DDR IN GENERAL TERMS 
DDR is the acronym for disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating belligerents 
into society.  It is the final step in the peace process, occurring after all agreements have 
been signed and a cease fire declared.8  The disarming portion usually takes place during 
a government sponsored ceremony, in the vicinity of the organization’s base camp.  
Demobilization is accompanied by a certain amount of pomp and circumstance during 
ceremonies, whose purpose is to lend credence to the event and to reinforce a 
psychological change from “fighter to friend” in the minds of the individuals.  After 
weapons are turned over to the state, the demobilization process can begin.  It normally 
entails: immediate confessions (usually met with some pre-agreed amnesty or pardon), 
disclosure of information through a series of interviews, and a physical and psychological 
wellness exams.  The last step on in this process is reintegration.  It is the longest of the 
three stages of the process.  During this stage demobilized personnel make the transition 
to student and complete one of many job training and professional development courses.  
Once completed, they can be returned to society and theoretically become productive 
citizens.  This can only occur successfully if there is reciprocation from the public.  The 
entire process is doomed if the population will not accept these former fighters as equals.   
 
1. Why is DDR an Important Tool for Managing Conflicts? 
Colombian insurgencies, paramilitary groups, or any other type of IAG, have 
never been entirely defeated with bullets and bombs.  This is not to imply that force has 
                                                 
7  Arvelo, 5. 
8 The AUC did not agree to a cease fire until the Ralito Accords of 2003, nearly one year after the 
AUC DDR process had already begun. 
4not played a huge role in each of Colombia’s violent conflicts.  Simply put, it is 
impossible to kill or capture every belligerent.  Most wars, especially insurgent wars, end 
as a result of a political agreement.  Therefore, DDR is the most effective way to get  
 
Table 1.1: Ratios of weapon turn in to demobilized fighter (as of 2005) 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia


















Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 
Translated from the Colombian Department of Interior and Justice Webpage; assessed on 10 June 2006. 
 
those who still resist to surrender to government authorities.  By providing an acceptable 
way out for belligerents, DDR can terminate a conflict long before it might otherwise 
have been resolved.  One of the most frequently used metric to determine DDR’s success 
is to look at the ratio of demobilized fighter to weapons.  As of 2005, Colombia’s fighter 
to gun ratio [see table 1.1] was .61.9 One year later, the total number of demobilized 
fighters increased to 30,915 while the total number of weapons increased to almost 
17,000.10  These statistics combine for a fighter to gun ratio of .55, still far above the 
                                                 
9  Minister of the Interior and Justice, Republic of Colombia, "Reincorporation Program," 
http://www.mininteriorjusticia.gov.co/pagina5.asp?cat=22 (accessed June 15, 2006). 
10  Michael Spagat, "Colombia's Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success," Article Originally 
Published in: Hechos Del Callejón by UNDP, Colombia. (JUN 2006), 
<http://www.cerac.org.co/colombia_research_home.htm> (accessed August 10, 2006), p 2. 
5world average of 2005.  It should also be noted that many of the weapons that have been 
turned in are new ones.11 
 
2. Colombian President Uribe’s Decision to DDR the AUC. 
Colombian President Alvero Uribe’s first priority upon taking office in 2002 was 
to resolve Colombia’s protracted conflict and attempt to bring peace to the country.  This 
goal was no different that those of his predecessors since 1960.  Uribe endured the 
violence in Colombia and realized that the first step in the peace process would be to 
remove the AUC from the equation.  The past had shown that demobilized guerillas make 
easy targets for paramilitaries.  This was the case throughout the 1990’s with the FARC-
EP’s ill fated Patriotic Union political party, most of whose members were slaughtered.    
Therefore, shortly after taking office in 2002, Uribe’s administration initiated 
negotiations with many leaders from the AUC in an attempt to convince them to 
demobilize.  A successful AUC demobilization may cause the FARC-EP and the ELN to 
undertake their own demobilizations.  Uribe is counting on this, focusing scarce 
government resources on one IAG at a time.  Nonetheless, if the AUC DDR process 
continues on its current course, it may be cited by Colombia’s other two main insurgent 
groups to justify their claims that the GOC is corrupt and deals in bad faith.   
 
C.   PURPOSE/THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis analyzes the Government of Colombia’s (GOC’s) demobilization of 
the paramilitary organizations known collectively as the Auto-defensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) and the re-insertion of its fighters into Colombian society.  So far, this 
DDR process has not achieved the majority its goals, while other problems loom on the 
horizon.  The thesis addresses the implications for Colombia and makes 
recommendations for future DDR processes.  The study divides the process into two 
elements: the agreement between the AUC and the GOC, and the implementation of the 
terms of the agreement.   The contract between the two parties is found in Colombian 
Law 782 of 2002 and 975 of 2005, better known as the Peace and Justice Law.  The 
                                                 
11  Spagat, 3. 
6Ministry of Justice and of Interior is responsible for implementing the terms found in 
these laws.  Should be 1 ½ lines of text at the top of the page 
A central argument of this thesis is that, in order for the GOC successfully to 
carry out DDR of the AUC, it must not only contend with current and former paramilitary 
members, but must also address the societal problems that permit illegal armed groups to 
thrive in Colombia.  Success in Colombia must be matched in the international 
community which must perceive the DDR process as legitimate.  In short, if the public 
perceives penalties as being too lenient, the process will be de-legitimized.  If penalties 
are perceived as being too harsh by the former paramilitary members, or the Paras, they 
will likely stop participating and reconstitute their former organizations.  In order to 
prevent either of these pitfalls, the GOC must develop a formula that gains control over 
former AUC controlled terrain and its population, essentially extending government 
control throughout the country.   This is the only way to prevent both de-legitimization of 
the process and former paramilitary members from reconstituting their organizations.  If 
the GOC can accomplish this, the DDR will be successful; if it cannot, the DDR will fail. 
 
D.   METHODOLOGY   
In order to provide a frame of reference and to understand how Colombia’s 
contemporary environment has evolved, the introduction begins with a brief survey of 
Colombia’s past demobilizations.  Colombia’s long and complex history is well 
documented and is not within the scope of this thesis.  However, salient historical events 
have been included in order to provide a contextual base.  The introduction defines the 
DDR process and explains what is at stake for the GOC, the AUC, and the other IAG’s 
who operate throughout Colombia.  The chapter goes on to describe how Colombian 
President Alvero Uribe’s background may have influenced his decision to attempt to 
demobilize the AUC.  
Chapter II addresses the Peace and Justice Law.  It offers a general overview of 
the main components of the law.  Law 975 of 2005 now known as The Peace and Justice 
Law provides the legal framework for the DDR process and is the result of several years 
of negotiations between the two parties.  The chapter begins by illustrating how each step 
7in the law’s evolution, from past IAG’s demobilizations to the Ralito Accords of 2003, 
have affected the terms found in the law.  The chapter then explains how the threat of 
extradition to the United States has affected the DDR process.  Next, the law’s critics and 
their affect on the Law and the DDR process are addressed, objections that bring into 
question the law’s legitimacy.  Finally, the continual revisions in the form of decrees are 
detailed.  It should be noted that it is well beyond the scope of this thesis to delve deeply 
into each intricate provision of the law.  Instead, it will use a basic overview to provide a 
general understanding of the scope of the law as well as what, in the eyes of its critics, 
constitute the law’s shortcomings.   
Chapter III describes the mechanics of the reintegration process.  It begins by 
listing the goals of the Colombian Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the department 
tasked with handling the reintegration of the AUC.  Essentially, the reintegration phase is 
meant to equip former fighters with a solid foundation and an alternative to illegal 
activities.  Next, the role of Colombia’s Servicio National de Aprendizaje or National 
Training Service (SEDA – Spanish acronym) is explained.  The SEDA has existed since 
the 1950’s to provide academic and technical job training.  At the request of the 
Colombian Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the service has developed, and 
consequently implements, an 18 month, four phase training program.  The remainder of 
the chapter clarifies each phase: initiation, evolution, development, and consolidation.   
Chapter IV explains why it is necessary for the GOC to gain a strategic advantage 
prior to future demobilization negotiations with IAGs.  As argued in the previous two 
chapters, the GOC entered into negotiations with the AUC at a position of weakness.  
Due to this fact, the Ralito Accords and the Peace and Justice Law concede significant 
advantage to the AUC.  Therefore, the chapter focuses on setting conditions before 
negotiating a DDR agreement with an IAG.  These conditions virtually remove all other 
options from IAGs, besides the one to demobilize.  This approach achieves this by 
securing the environment while providing the population with other opportunities besides 
supporting IAGs.  If implemented correctly, the two strategies listed within the chapter, 
will limit IAG controlled areas, thus making them vulnerable to the COLMIL.  Only 
8when an IAG is cornered by the government will they, in earnest, conduct a legitimate 
DDR process.   
The concluding chapter summarizes previous points and provides 
recommendations on how Colombia can improve future demobilization processes.  It 
begins by analyzing U.S. assistance and policy towards the DDR process and 
recommends how funds could be better allocated.  It then recommends how the GOC 
should set favorable conditions prior to negotiating with and IAG.  Terms to be included 
in future laws governing a DDR process and how the GOC could better utilize the 
international community are also included in the chapter.  Other recommendations 
attempt to solve the reintegration phase’s funding deficit and the protection issues.   
Finally, the chapter explains the DDR process as a system with the success of each phase 
riding on the success of the others.  It is imperative that the GOC view future DDR 
processes in this way to avoid assured failure. 
9II. LEY JUSTICIA Y PAZ (PEACE AND JUSTICE LAW) 
A.   HISTORY OF THE LAW 
The roots of Colombian Law 975 of 2005, known as the Ley Justicia Y Paz, or the 
Justice and Peace Law, can be traced back over twenty years to Colombian President 
Belisario Betancur’s (1982-1986) administration.  Betancur convinced the country’s four 
major Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs) -- The Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de 
Colombia -  Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP), the Ejercito Popular de Liberation (EPL), 
the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), and the Autodefensa Obrera (ADO) -- to sign truces.   
Although these agreements eventually fell apart, the Betancur administration’s 
negotiations laid the foundation that later led to the demobilization of seven IAGs: M-19 
(March 1990); Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) (August 1990); 
Comands Ernesto Rojas, EPL (August 1990); Movamiento Armado Quintin Lame 
(MAQL) (March 1991); Corriente de Renovacion Socialista (CRS) (December 1993); 
Frente Francisco Garnica (June 1994); and the Movimiento Independiente 
Revolucionario-Comandos Armados (MIR-COAR) (January 1997).  The agreements 
evolved over time, each one more complex than its predecessor, eventually leading to 
Law 418 of 1997 and Law 782 of 2002.   
Law 418 was designed to facilitate individual desertions among IAGs while Law 
782 of 2002 targeted collective DDR of IAG members.  Essentially, each law grants 
generous pardons for sedition and but does not excuse involvement in atrocities.  Both 
laws also grant economic, health, and educational benefits to those who lay down their 
arms.  The main difference between the two laws is that individual deserters must have 
their membership verified by the government while collective demobilizations are 
verified by the commander of the unit.12  So eager to demobilize were many AUC blocks 
that, as early as 2005, over 7000 members had processed through DDR.  Other block 
commanders however, would not agree to DDR until pardons were offered for atrocities.  
Clearly, this move indicated that they had been involved in one form or another with an 
atrocity.  Consequently, the Congress of Colombia passed the controversial Law 975 of 
                                                 
12  Minister of the Interior and Justice, Republic of Colombia, "Reincorporation Program," 
http://www.mininteriorjusticia.gov.co/pagina5.asp?cat=22 (accessed June 15, 2006). 
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2005 which places such restrictions on investigations that it gives those who committed 
crimes a virtual pardon. 
 
B. LAW 975 OF 2005 
On July 15, 2003 Colombia’s Peace Commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, signed 
a peace accord with AUC representatives at Sante Fe del Ralito, Cordoba.13  The Ralito 
Accords, as the agreement is known, required the AUC to “end hostilities,” “totally 
demobilize,” and “affirm” their support of Colombian anti-drug laws.14   In turn, the 
GOC agreed to “… take the necessary steps to incorporate the demobilized paramilitaries 
into civilian life and ensure the security of those who gave up their arms.”15  The accord 
was the result of over a year of intense negotiations between the two parties.  The 
agreement essentially is encompassed in the terms of Law 975, the Peace and Justice 
Law, passed by the Colombian Congress on June 21, 2005.16  This gave the peace 
process a “legal framework,” essentially legitimizing the DDR process.17  The law has 
been amended many times since 2005 in order to prevent the AUC from backing out of 
the agreement, to incorporate the observations of critics, and to respond to court rulings 
on aspects of the law.  It requires AUC members to surrender their weapons, provide 
officials with detailed information on the organization, and turn over all illegal financial 
assets to the Colombian National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation to be 
placed in the “Victims Reparation Fund.”18  Funds are meant for victims and their 
families who have claims against the AUC.  In return, the Paras will receive: speedy 
trials, sentences no greater than eight years, humane treatment, an interpreter (if needed), 
                                                 
13  Arvelo, 5. 
14  Colombain Government Peace Commission, "Santa Fé De Ralito Accord to Contribute to Peace in 
Colombia," Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/santafederalito-
accord.php (accessed January 12, 2007). 
15  Ibid. 
16  Constanza Vieira, "Colombia: Rights Groups Assail Paramilitary 'Impunity' Law," Global 
Information Network (Jun 28, 2005), 1, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=859995351& 
Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  
17  Ibid. 
18  "Justice and Peace in Colombia," The Washington Post, August 1, 2005,  http://proquest.umi.com 
/pqdweb? did=875736131&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 29 August2006). 
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legal assistance, the right to file for reparation if harmed, and information on decisions 
that will affect them.19  Originally, state prosecutors were limited to “60 days to 
investigate and verify” accusations against the AUC, an impossibility given the huge 
volume of demobilizations.20   So, in May 2006, Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
declared many of the law’s tenets unconstitutional, forcing the Colombian Congress to 
amend the law and completely remove the 60 day restriction on investigations.21  
Another change requires all personal assets belonging to Paramilitary Bosses, even if 
legally attained, to go into the Victims Reparation Fund.22  This amendment caused many 
AUC leaders to cry foul and threaten to back out of the deal.   For its part, the GOC 
threatened to play their only remaining ace -- extradition.   
 
C.  PROS AND CONS 
1.  Threat of Extradition  
The most attractive incentive aimed at the Paramilitary Bosses, and for the most 
part every AUC member, was exemption from the threat of extradition to the United 
States.23  The threat of extradition seems to be the main reason that the process has not 
completely fallen apart.  Every time the process appears to be in jeopardy of collapsing or 
the AUC leadership becomes uncooperative, Uribe’s administration dangles the threat of 
extradition over their heads.  This is why, in August 2006, the Colombian President 
ordered “… the arrest of the leadership of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia ... 
so the peace process can go forward and gain credibility.”24  Having the leaders in 
                                                 
19  Justice and Peace in Colombia, A 16. 
20  "Colombian Government Sets 'Justice and Peace' Law Regulation," US Fed News Service, 
Including US State News (January 2, 2006), http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=982149541&Fmt=7 
&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed  August 28, 2006). 
21  "Colombia Fear and Intimidation: The Dangers of Human Rights Work," Amnesty International, 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR230332006?open&of=ENG-COL (accessed September 8, 
2006). 
22  "The Americas: Crime and (Maybe) Punishment; Colombia's Paramilitaries," The Economist 380, 
no. 8492 (August 26, 2006), 39, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1111107081&Fmt =7&clientId= 
65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed August 28, 2006). 
23  Justice and Peace in Colombia, A 16.  
24  Joshua Goodman, "Colombia Arrests Militia Leaders; Government Says Paramilitary Group 
Violated Peace Accord," The Washington Post, August 17, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did 
=1095948421&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed August 29, 2006), A 20. 
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custody, Uribe has gained the upper hand.  The president has essentially taken a page out 
of the AUC playbook.  If these former leaders refuse to encourage members of their 
former organizations to cooperate, then they can easily be extradited to the United States.  
The GOC is well aware that extradition is the Colombian Narco-Trafficers’ greatest 
fear.25  Shortly after the arrest of the AUC Kingpins, the Minister of Interior and Justice, 
Sabas Pretelt stated: “[t]hey’re not going to be extradited, but they have to start 
complying with soberness [with] what they’ve agreed to.”26  Unfortunately, so far, the 
former leaders refuse to comply with all the conditions set out in the agreement.  Delays 
will only hurt the government because the process will lose its momentum.  Foot 
dragging and legal objections thrown up by Colombia’s Supreme Court are matched by 
opposition to what is perceived as generous terms offered to the AUC by Colombia’s 
population and the international community.   
 
2.  Criticism  
Hardly had it been passed in June 2005, than the Peace and Justice Law 
immediately met with harsh criticism.  Jose Miguel Vivanco, The Americas director for 
Human Rights Watch called it “a bad deal both for Colombians and the international 
community, and that it sets a disastrous precedent for future negotiations with other 
armed groups.” 27  Amnesty International stated that the “new law will grant impunity to 
paramilitary combatants guilty of gross human rights abuses by providing for reduced 
sentences.”28 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
Michael Fruhling, also criticized the law: 
Negotiations to overcome the conflict in Colombia must comply with 
internationally established principles of truth, justice and reparations for 
the victims…  The human rights crimes must be clarified [and] the victims 
need the full support of the state… in a constructive manner, to the 
                                                 
25  Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo : The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw, 1st ed. (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), 296, p 50. 
26  Goodman, Colombia Arrests Militia Leaders; Government Says Paramilitary Group Violated 
Peace Accord, A 20. 
27  Vieira, "Colombia: Rights Groups Assail Paramilitary 'Impunity' Law." 
28  Ibid. 
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processes of negotiation with illegal armed groups, in order to overcome 
the armed conflict and avoid impunity. 29   
Two weeks following the bill’s passage, Colombian citizens established The 
Movement of Victims of Crimes of State (MVCE).30  The organization was created not 
only to assist victims to receive reparations, but also to ensure that justice is upheld.  
According to a lawyer for the group, “… the way will begin to be paved to achieve 
justice, establish the truth about what happened, make reparations effective, and above 
all, ensure that these crimes are not repeated.”31  With all of this opposition to the Peace 
and Justice Law, it is no wonder that it is in a constant state of revision.   
 
3. Revisions 
Issued in December of 2005, barely six months after the law’s passage, decree 
4760 places “special emphasis on subjects related to orientation and legal assistance to 
victims, the divulgation of their rights, their active participation in judicial processes, 
their right to reparation, and the fund regulation in the law for such effects.”32  Basically 
the declaration was a sign to both the international and national human rights groups that 
the administration was listening.  But the law’s critics complained that it did not address 
the shortcomings that they had been citing since its passage.  AUC spin-off criminal 
organizations started to spring up in areas where the AUC had already completed the 
DDR process.  The spectacle of “demobilized” AUC leaders still free to move around the 
country escorted by huge entourages of bodyguards, hob-nobbing with members of 
Uribe’s administration and riding around in new Hummers, irked the critics.33   Other 
discoveries of collaboration between AUC leaders and high-level GOC officials only 
                                                 
29  Diana Losada and Christine Evans, "The Urgent Need for Truth, Justice and Reparations in 
Colombia." Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Respect: The Human 
Rights Newsletter. 4 (April, 2005), 3, http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs 
/issue4respect.pdf (accessed July 2006), p 3. 
30  Vieira, "Colombia: Rights Groups Assail Paramilitary 'Impunity' Law.” 
31  Ibid. 
32  Colombian Government Sets 'Justice and Peace' Law Regulation. 
33  "Colombia Jails Right-Wing Paramilitary Leaders," New York Times August 17, 2006, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1095910101&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 28 August 2006). 
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fanned the flames.34  Alirio Uribe, a leader of an international human rights group, told 
the Global International Network: “… paramilitary fighters have obtained legal benefits 
precluding investigations or prosecutions, or pardons, without having confessed to their 
crimes and are living freely.”35  For these reasons, in August 2006 President Uribe 
ordered the arrest of all top AUC leaders.36  The president does not have much flexibility.  
If he pushes too hard on the AUC leadership, the process may crumble.  If he is too 
lenient, domestic and international pressure may de-legitimize the whole process, and 
may cause it to fail.  As stated earlier, the only leverage that the administration has left to 
force cooperation is to threaten to extradite the AUC leadership to the United States to 
stand trial on drug charges.  So, at the present, the outcome of the demobilization is in 
doubt.   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Peace and Justice law simply does not measure up to international standards.  
For instance, the AUC was not even required to stop hostilities while negotiating with the 
GOC.  The law also provides excessively lenient terms such as limited jail terms for those 
who have committed murder and other forms of atrocity, and also for drug lords; 
meanwhile it provides little assistance or reparation to their victims.  These obvious 
shortcomings have caused both the national and international communities to cry foul.   
The GOC has given far too many concessions to the AUC in a desperate attempt to 
convince them to enter the DDR process.  It is understandable that Uribe’s administration 
should have offered some incentives to the AUC, but a vocal group of critics have argued 
that the law went too far.  The administration underestimated the scale of opposition that 
challenged the legitimacy of the DDR process.  The recent scandal exposing the close ties 
between the AUC and politicians close to Uribe has given rise to suspicions that 
paramilitary criminals were deliberately given an easy deal, thereby raising the specter of 
                                                 
34  Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Colombia to Expose Militia's Reach ; Six Lawmakers Face Questioning by 
Colombia's Supreme Court this Week Over their Alleged Links to Paramilitary Forces." The Christian 
Science Monitor, Dec 5, 2006, http://libproxy.nps .navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy. 
nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=1173789141&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
35  Vieira, "Colombia: Rights Groups Assail Paramilitary 'Impunity' Law." 
36  Goodman, A.20. 
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impunity and corruption that not only threatens to discredit the DDR process, but also 
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III. REINSERTION PROCESS 
A. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND JUSTICE 
The Ministry of Interior and Justice is the lead agency handling all phases of the 
AUC reintegration program.37  According to the High Commissioner for the Social and 
Economic Reinstatement of Persons and Illegal Armed Groups, the agency’s five goals 
are:  
 1.  To contribute to improve the security and political stability of the country. 
2. To re-establish the conditions which allow the reintegration of the armed     
participants. 
 3.  To prevent future outbreaks of violence. 
 4.  To contribute to national reconciliation. 
5.  To free resources, both human and financial ones, for post-war reconstruction 
and development.38   
The reintegration process is designed to give the former fighters a solid 
foundation and alternative to their illegal past.  The biggest challenge to the program is 
preventing former fighters from leaving the program early and turning back to their lives 
of crime.   
In order to keep the rehabilitation of the individual fighters on track, the Ministry 
of Interior and Justice in conjunction with Colombia’s National Training Service (SENA 
- Spanish acronym), has devised a four step, eighteen month training program.39  The 
SENA was developed in the late 1950’s by labor unions and the Catholic Church to 
provide social and technical training to workers throughout Colombia.40  There are 114 
SENA classroom/workshop locations, primarily concentrated in the areas where the DDR 
process was most active.41   
                                                 
37  Iliana Baca, USAID Project Manager for Colombia's Individual Deserter Program, Bogota, 
Colombia, June 21, 2006. 
38  Juan David Angel, Director of Colombia's Reintegration Program, Bogota, Colombia, June 21, 
2006. 
39  CINTERFOR: Inter-American Research and Documentation Center on Vocational Training, "The 
Minister of the Interior and of Justice and SENA's Director Sign an Agreement for the Reinserted," 
Copyright © 1996-2006 International Labour Organization, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region 
/ampro/cinterfor/ifp/sena/agree.htm (accessed September 1, 2006). 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
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The four phases of the reintegration process are:  initiation, evolution, 
development, and consolidation.  Each phase is further divided into modules as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 below.   
Figure 3.1:  Reintegration overview. 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia
Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil



































Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 
Translated from the Colombian Department of Interior and Justice Webpage; accessed on 10 June 2006.  
 
B. PHASES OF COLLECTIVE RESTORATION 
 
1. Phase I: Initiation 
The Initiation phase consists of a six month period that reintroduces individuals to 
Colombian society.42  This period is broken down into individual documentation, medical 
and psychological physical examinations, humanitarian assistance, and an educational 
module, which is a series of reintegration courses [see Figure 3.2].  This phase begins 
immediately following a demobilization ceremony, where the paramilitary members, or 
                                                 
42  Minister of the Interior and Justice, Republic of Colombia, "Reincorporation Program," 
http://www.mininteriorjusticia.gov.co/pagina5.asp?cat=22 (accessed June 15, 2006). 
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Paras, turn in their weapons and officially demobilize.  The first processing station is 
documentation. Here, information on a Para’s situation is collected and entered into a 
database created and maintained by USAID.43  Pertinent individual, demographic, and 
family information is processed in order to derive a complete picture of a person’s 
circumstances, offering valuable insight into why a person would join this type of 
organization.  At the next station, members are given an opportunity to confess to any 
crimes they may have committed while serving in the AUC.  Legal teams then apply the 
terms set forth in the Peace and Justice Law in order to determine what crimes require an 
investigation and/or if pardons or amnesty can be applied.  It should be noted that this is 
the only period where crimes can be considered for pardon or amnesty.  Next, individuals 
are given complete medical and psychiatric examination.  Problems that require 
immediate care are attended to by medical personnel.  They also re-evaluate individuals  
 
Figure 3.2: Progress report of the Ministry of Interior and Justice’s Reintegration Phase I (June 
2006). 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia
Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil
INITIATION
16 PARAMILITARY GROUPS
Date of Demobilization. 12-Dec-05 to 30-Apr-06
Documentation - Health - Humanitarian Aid –
Initial Module – Certainty of life
6 months
Phase 1 of Collective Reintegration
Psycho-social support
19,858   Beneficiaries
The program
 
Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 
Translated from the Colombian Department of Interior and Justice Webpage; accessed on 20 June 2006.  
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continually throughout the remaining phases to ensure their well being.  The next step 
requires individuals to begin the Certainty of Life module.44    
 
a.   Certainty of Life Module 
The Certainty of Life module is designed to educate and begin to 
reintegrate individuals into society.  Classes reintroduce the ex-paramilitaries, now 
students, to norms of behavior and communication in Colombian society, the value of 
life, and other social and moral principles required to facilitate their transition.  Things 
that most people take for granted, like using ATM machines or balancing a checkbook, 
are taught during this module.  Students also receive instruction on table manners and 
other commonly accepted courtesies.  As long as members continue to participate in the 
process, they are eligible to receive a monthly salary equivalent to $155 U.S., or roughly 
$350,000 COP.45  Since the initial transition from fighter to student is the most complex 
and difficult, it is essential that they remain inside the training pipeline.  With this stage, 
Paras pass the point of no return and become responsible citizens.  Once they have 
completed this phase, they will progress to the Evolution Phase.46 
 
2.  Phase II: Evolution 
The Evolution phase consists of the continued humanitarian assistance with a 
basic academic and occupational skills course taught over a six month period [see Figure 
3.2].  The period is divided into the Academic and Occupational Module.47  Individuals 
are tested at the beginning of the phase in order to determine their baseline education 
level.  Once tested, students are grouped by ability levels and begin attending classes.  
Class curricula are tailored to fit each group’s academic level.  Towards the end of this 
module, the faculty assists each student with career choices.  A wide range of fields are 
offered, from computer programming to building furniture – in short, solid entry level 
                                                 
44  Minister of the Interior and Justice. 
45  Angel, Bogota.  
46  Minister of the Interior and Justice. 
47  Angel, Bogota.  
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jobs.48  Faculty members ensure that career field choices are available in a student’s 
geographic area and suited to his or her academic abilities.49  At the conclusion of this 
phase, students move on to the Developmental phase. 
 
Figure 3.2: Progress report of the Ministry of Interior and Justice’s Reintegration Phase II (June 
2006). 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia
Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil
EVOLUTION
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Date of Demobilization. 15-Jun-05 to 22-Oct-05
Health - Humanitarian Aid   




Phase 2 of Collective Reintegration
The program
  
Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 
Translated from the Colombian Department of Interior and Justice Webpage; accessed on 20 June 2006.  
 
3. Phase III: Development 
The Development phase consists of career training and culminates in a 
community project.  The phase is also six months long and contains, Occupation and 
Project modules [see Figure 3.3].  The Occupation Module, as the name implies, teaches 
the skills needed to work in the private sector.  The intensity of the training varies 
depending on a student’s ability.  Normally the module will last one month.  At the 
termination of this module, the classes are divided into project groups and given the 
assignment to plan and complete community project.  This not only requires students to 
                                                 
48  Minister of the Interior and Justice. 
49  Angel, Bogota.  
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use their new skills, but also re-introduces former AUC members to their community.  
According to, Juan David Angel, Assistant to the Minster of the Interior and head of the 
Reinsertion Program, most students are enlisted to construct or repair public 
infrastructure, or, on occasion, employed in the manual defoliation of drug crops like 
marijuana and coca plants.50  Upon completion, students progress on to the final phase, 
Consolidation. 
 
Figure 3.3: Progress report of the Ministry of Interior and Justice’s Reintegration Phase III (June 
2006). 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia
Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil
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The program
  
Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 
Translated from the Colombian Department of Interior and Justice Webpage; accessed on 20 June 2006.  
 
4. Phase IV: Consolidation 
The final of the four phases in the process is the Consolidation Phase.  As the 
name suggest, students are expected to consolidate their skills and use them as productive 
members of society.  The phase begins with each member receiving their on-the-job 
training in the local economy [see Figure 3.4].  According to Iliana Baca, the USAID 
Program Director for the Individual Deserter Program, the Uribe administration is 
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working on a plan to give incentives to private sector companies that employ former 
paramilitaries.51  Although the administration has yet to implement it, something needs to 
be done to persuade the private sector to provide employment to these former Paras in 
order for them to become productive members of Colombian society. 
 
Figure 3.4: Progress report of the Ministry of Interior and Justice’s Reintegration Phase III (June 
2006). 
Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia
Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil
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Source: Available from http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?doc=114&cat=22; Internet; 




Unfortunately, the reinsertion program described in this chapter is a perfect world 
scenario.  Although this phase of the DDR process continues, problems remain.  For 
instance, the salary that ex-Paras receive is far less than even the lowest ranking Para is 
likely to have been earning prior to demobilization.  In fact, with adjustments for 
inflation, the current salary that students receive is only a few dollars higher than what a 
demobilized M-19 member had received in 1990.  On the other hand, there are currently 
thirty times more demobilized AUC members than there were during the 1990 M-19 
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demobilization.  In fact, the large number of paramilitaries wishing to demobilize caught 
the GOC by surprise, in large part because it had no accurate statistics on AUC strength.  
It is clear that the GOC is well aware of the pay shortfall.  Nonetheless, the GOC appears 
to be either unable or unwilling to resolve it.  Perhaps there simply are not enough funds 
for a pay increase.  Additionally, even if a student completes the training, there is no 
guarantee that he or she will have a job.  This is another matter that the GOC needs to 
rectify.  As of yet, they have had little progress in convincing the civilian sector to assist 
with jobs.  This could be done by providing tax incentives to private companies that hire 
graduates.  Another force pulling students out of the program is their familiarity with 
weapons and their knowledge of criminal organizations.  This combination makes them 
attractive recruits for other criminal organizations.  In fact, in many areas where this 
training has occurred, new drug trafficking groups have begun to spring up.52  An 
unproven but logical conclusion is that these groups are formed and manned by former 
Paras.  This rumor is only exacerbated by the fact that the GOC is reluctant to release 
current numbers of those still active in the program.53  It also raises suspicions that they 
lack the mean to monitor allegedly demobilized Paras.   
Despite all of these faults, the reintegration program still moves forward, but its 
overall success remains open to question.  The only thing that is certain is that if the 
public sector does not accept the demobilized Paras back into society, many will return to 
a life of crime.  Public sympathy for former members of an illegal organization that 
constantly targeted civilians remains low.  Additionally, competition for jobs between the 
unemployed citizens and former AUC members will only breed more public hatred and 
resentment towards them. 
                                                 
52 Constanza Vieira, "Colombia: Paramilitarites Re-Emerge as Black-Clad Thugs," Global 
Information Network (Apr 11, 2006), 1, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1019544131& 
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IV. FUTURE DEMOBILIZATIONS 
A. SETTING THE CONDITIONS PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS  
The only way that the GOC can succeed in future DDR processes is to remove 
every other option available to an IAG, except the one to demobilize.  Simply put, in 
future negotiations with IAGs, the GOC has to wait until it has a strategic advantage 
before beginning the process.  This way it can dictate the terms of the negotiations and 
the end state, the DDR process.  Negotiating from a point of weakness has resulted at best 
in an only partially successful AUC DDR.  As the previous chapters have argued, the 
AUC was never pressured to demobilize during its negotiations with the GOC.  In fact, 
the GOC seemed to be bending over backwards to make the process consequence free for 
the AUC, a policy of all carrot and no stick that sent a strong message of government 
weakness.  As a consequence, the AUC and other criminal groups took advantage of the 
DDR process to enhance their strategic position, leaving most of the promises found in 
the 2003 Ratlito accords unfulfilled.  This pattern was repeated in the Peace and Justice 
Law of July 2005, which virtually handed members amnesty for past crimes.54   
Therefore, in order to set favorable conditions, the GOC must implement a 
comprehensive Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy, one that forces IAGs to conclude 
that demobilization is the best option.  Colombia’s current COIN strategy fails to do this 
as it has focus mainly on destroying guerillas while ignoring or even cooperating with the 
paramilitaries.  The Colombian Military (COLMIL), which consists of both military and 
Colombian National Police Forces (CNP), has implemented this strategy for over 42 
years and it has failed to bring peace to the nation.  The new strategy must focus on 
retaining control of population and the terrain. 
 
B. SECURING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Basically, the state has two strategies that they may implement in order to defeat 
an IAG.  They are based upon controlling more and more territory while, in a sense, 
                                                 
54  "The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobilization Or Legalization?" Amnesty International, 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR230192005?open&of=ENG-COL (accessed February, 12, 
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pushing out IAGs.55  Optimally, a state should strive to enlarge areas already under its 
control while concentrating its resources on areas that are the least contested.56  The first 
of the two strategies is to secure the area and protect the population from IAG 
retaliations.  The DDR process is an important component of this, but to be effective, the 
GOC must be prepared to occupy and secure the territory vacated by a demobilized 
group.  Thus, security is gained by deploying resources into the public sector, such as 
military and police forces, infrastructure development, and quality of life projects, etc…   
These improvements must not be simply given to the public.  They must be tied to a 
behavioral shift.  This shift must provide a return to the government, usually in the form 
of intelligence.  This is only possible in a secure environment where the threat of 
retaliation from illegal actors is minimized.  This fact, as stated earlier, makes security 
the highest priority.   
Once a state has successfully provided security for the population in a given area, 
it can now implement strategy two, utilizing the resources that were collected from the 
population to target the IAG and its support structure and network.  Resources, usually in 
the form of intelligence and assistance, are pieced together and used to plan and 
coordinate direct attacks.  In addition to killing or capturing IAG members, the 
organization’s funding, fueling, arming, supplying, along with the underground support 
network can now be uncovered and attacked.  As the operational tempo increases, the 
state must not only continue to secure the population but they must also reestablish and 
reinforce the local government in that area.  As the state continues to conduct these 
operations, it should push further out into the countryside while retaining control of the 
terrain that it previously had secured.  This is inherently resource intensive which is the 
principle reason why this strategy cannot be used simultaneously around the country. 
 
C.  MATCHING THEORY WITH REALITY  
In Colombia, the GOC through its various agencies, principally the COLMIL, 
executes these strategies but with uneven results.  Primarily, the COLMIL executes 
                                                 
55  McCormick, Gordon H., Dr., "Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare" (Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA., 2 February, 2006). 
56  Ibid. 
27
strategy two, with little regard to the first.  Normally it deploys forces to highly contested 
areas to conduct search and attach operations in an attempt to kill IAG members.  From 
numerous bases that are scattered throughout the country, the COLMIL sweeps the 
countryside looking for illegal actors.  Forces will often occupy a village or town for 
short periods and attempt to solicit information on IAGs from the population.  Even if the 
population desires to share intelligence, they normally do not.  In addition, the 
government’s witness protection programs last only four months, leaving those who have 
given evidence, and their families, vulnerable to assassination.   
The bottom line is that the current strategy spreads out security forces too thinly 
across the country, normally shuffling troops around them pacify “hot spots” or troubled 
areas.  In addition, the GOC has failed to deploy the necessary resources, mainly military 
resources, in order to secure areas that were formally under the control of the AUC.  The 
result of which has been either the reoccupation of these areas by the FARC-EP or the 
ELN or a resurgence of pseudo paramilitary organizations.  For these reasons the GOC 
have been unable to retain control of significant areas.   In addition to space, there is also 
a factor of time.  Although the COLMIL sometimes provides security to the population, it 
can only occupy an area for a limited period.  Therefore, the population remains reluctant 
to collaborate with government forces for fear of retaliation at a later date.  The GOC also 
commits resources to areas in the hope of convincing the population to assist the 
COLMIL with information.  However, the population seldom if ever is forced to 
reciprocate or collaborate with the government’s agents before receiving public funding 
and other resources.  Essentially there are no strings attached and no returns go to the 
GOC.   
The situation remains relatively unchanged for over forty years, leaving the 
Colombian population at the center of the conflict.  Whether they remain willing or 
unwilling, they will continue to shield, through fear or passivity, these illegal groups.  In 
essence, the population is insulating IAGs from agents of the Colombian State.57   
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1.   Reversing the Course 
Prior any demobilization negotiations, the GOC must make a significant 
investment in the CNP.  The CNP, generally regarded as a corrupt and inept organization, 
must be purged, restructured, trained, and funded properly.  Under-funded and underpaid, 
the CNP currently plays a secondary role to the Colombian Army (COLAR) and other 
military forces in current COIN campaign.  This role must be reversed.  Once this 
transition is completed, strategy one can now be implemented. 
There are eleven or so urbanized areas that are considered secure and fully under 
the control of the GOC.  From these cities, the GOC can begin to expand its control onto 
the cummunas or slums surrounding these cities by deploying the COLAR to secure an 
outer ring around the city.  Police forces now can enter the scene and occupy and or 
establish operating law enforcement stations throughout the area.  After the police have 
demonstrated that they have control of a specific area, the COLAR can now push out 
further into the countryside, creating second outer ring of security while leaving 
contingency forces behind in support of the police.  At this time, the GOC can begin to 
assist or install local government agencies.  Utilizing local laborers, state funded 
infrastructure improvements projects can also begin.   Concurrently, while these projects 
and improvements are being completed, police forces along with fiscalias or state 
investigators solicit the population for information on IAGs.  At this point the GOC can 
use this information to target the local IAG and its support network.  Eventually as time 
goes on, the GOC will remove illegal actors from the area.  The process can continue on 
until IAGs have little or no room to operate.   Once IAGs are forced to operate in smaller 
areas, they can be targeted more easily.  So pressured, IAGs will view the DDR process 
as their only viable option.  But this process must be a legitimate one that punishes bad 
actors, offer justice to the victims, and valid social and economic alternatives to the 
former members of the IAGs.  As too often in the past, the GOC appears to be trying “to 
DDR” their way our of a situation that requires the coordination of a complex political, 
military, economic, and social strategy, one that, so far, the GOC lacks the will, or the 




The approach outlined in this chapter explains how the GOC can gain a strategic 
advantage prior to negotiating with any IAG.  When implemented correctly, IAGs will 
have no other option besides a demobilization agreement.  Strategies for setting the 
conditions focus on how the GOC can regain control of the country over time and 
eventually push out IAGs from the area.  This approach should be implemented from 
existing centers of state control but can also work in areas that have been through a recent 
demobilization.  Strategy one focuses on securing the population and infrastructure.  
Strategy two focuses on targeting the illegal actors and their support network.  This may 
seem counter intuitive, especially to the Colombian military, however, its current strategy 
of primarily targeting IAGs and their support structure is a proven failure.  The approach 
is neither simple nor rapid.  It is a drawn out, methodical indirect attack on IAGs that 
limits their freedom of movement until they have no room to operate.  It achieves this by 
securing the environment while providing the population with other opportunities besides 
supporting IAGs.  If implemented correctly, this strategy will limit IAG controlled areas, 
thus making them vulnerable to the COLMIL.  Only when an IAG is cornered by the 


























A. WHAT WENT WRONG 
The DDR process to demobilize the AUC has undoubtedly registered some 
notable successes – 31,689 paramilitary demobilized and 18,024 weapons surrendered.  
The AUC has ceased to exist.  The government also claims a decline in homicides (which 
may or may not be measure of the AUC demobilization’s success).  However, it appears 
that the DDR process may simply be replacing one phenomenon with another.  What the 
GOC now terms as “newly emerging gangs” engaged in illegal activities appear to be 
rising from the ashes of the AUC.58  Furthermore, a scandal evolving at the time of 
writing has revealed paramilitary influence in the highest echelons of the GOC.  One may 
be forgiving for concluding that Bogota has a terminal case of “plus ça change!”   
The Colombian AUC DDR has failed to produce its desired results because of a 
combination of factors, first among them a flawed, under resourced strategy implemented 
from a position of weakness.  The entire process has produced a series of crises which the 
government has inadequately addressed with a series of improvisations and half hearted 
measures to solve difficult and complex problems.  For DDR process to function, there 
must be a willingness of the IAG to cease hostilities, usually because the government 
holds the upper hand.  However, even during the initial stages of negotiations between 
the AUC and the GOC, it became clear that the AUC dictated the terms.  The GOC 
focused primarily on dissolving the AUC’s organization and in the process, the issues of 
justice and reparations were shunted aside.  The initial version of the Peace and Justice 
Law, that passed both houses of the Colombian Congress, virtually absolved AUC 
members for all past crimes.59  Although some parts of the law were later declared 
unconstitutional, the law was seen as a sellout by the Uribe administration.60  The 
incentives to demobilize were also not adequate.  The Colombian state has proven either 
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unwilling or unable to commit sufficient resources to the reintegration of former 
combatants into society.  Although many Paras have entered into the DDR process, it 
remains unclear how many will remain after trading in their lavish lifestyle of Rolexes 
and nightlife for a $5.00-a- day job training course, at the end of which there was no or 
only poorly paid prospects for employment.  It is also unclear how many demobilized 
members were actually fighters and not peasants who were forced to “…play the part of 
paramilitary fighters…” during demobilization ceremonies.61  Finally, because the GOC 
entered into negotiations with the AUC from a position of weakness, it made concessions 
in both the Ralito Accords or the Peace and Justice Law which alienated significant 
segments of Colombian and international opinion, and which have failed to meet the 
minimum standards of both Colombian and International law.  The Colombian 
Government’s strategy to dissolve the AUC is evolving rapidly and threatens to replace 
ex-AUC with a myriad of other problems.   
 
1.   There Can Be No Peace in Colombia Without Justice 
The basic conditions for a successful implementation of the Peace and Justice 
Law were never created.  First, the law does not measure up to international standards.  
For instance, the AUC was not even required to stop hostilities while negotiating with the 
GOC.  The law also provides excessively lenient jail terms for those who have committed 
murder and other atrocities.  Drug lords are absolved of their crimes.  Meanwhile, little 
assistance or reparation is provided to their victims.  These blatant injustices have caused 
both the national and international communities to cry foul.   The GOC has given far too 
many concessions to the AUC in a desperate attempt to convince them to enter the DDR 
process.  It is understandable that Uribe’s administration should have offered some 
incentives to the AUC, but a vocal group of critics have argued that the law went too far.  
The administration underestimated the scale of opposition that challenged the legitimacy 
of the DDR process, and government scandals have marred the process.   
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In March 2006, the Departamento Adminstrativo de Seguridad (DAS), the 
Colombian equivalent to the FBI, seized a laptop computer belonging to former 
paramilitary commander, Rodrigo Toliver, alias Jorge 40.62  The computer’s files 
detailed the minutes and audio recordings of meetings between AUC leaders and 
Colombian government officials.  The files also contained information of how the 
militias would choose candidates, rig elections, and scam money from government 
healthcare services.63  From this and other evidence, ongoing investigations have resulted 
in the arrest of a governor and four congressmen and one congress women.  In other 
developments, on February 23rd 2007, the Colombian Federal Prosecutors office arrested 
Jorge Noguera, former head of the DAS, who is accused of conspiring with Jorge 40, to 
rig elections and illegally destroy criminal records.64   In a similar case, on Februrary 19, 
2007, the Colombian Foreign Minister, Maria Consuelo Araujo, announced that she was 
stepping down to remove speculation that she might interfere in the government’s case 
against family members accused of links to the AUC.  However, it is widely believed that 
her resignation was orchestrated by The Plaza Nariño.  If things weren’t bad enough for 
Uribe, the Colombian Supreme Court found that “… paramilitaries not only had 
influence over Congress, but that legislators and drug traffickers actually created their 
own paramilitary groups.”65  More arrest and resignations are sure to follow.  These 
recent scandals exposing the close ties between the AUC and politicians close to Uribe 
have given rise to suspicions that paramilitary criminals were deliberately given an easy 
deal, thereby raising the specter of impunity and corruption that not only threatens to 
discredit the DDR process, but also undermines the legitimacy of the GOC itself. 
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2.   Reintegration Without Restitution  
Although many Paras are demobilizing, problems remain.  For instance, the salary 
that ex-Paras receive during the reintegration phase is far less than even the lowest 
ranking Para is likely to have been earning prior to demobilization.  In fact, with 
adjustments for inflation, the current salary that students receive is only a few dollars 
higher than the pay of a demobilized M-19 member in 1990.  On the other hand, there are 
currently thirty times more demobilized AUC members than there were during the 1990 
M-19 demobilization.  It is clear that the GOC is well aware of the pay inadequacy.  
Nonetheless, the GOC appears to be either unable or unwilling to anything to resolve it.  
Perhaps there simply are not enough funds for a pay increase.  Additionally, even if a 
student completes the training, there is no guarantee that he or she will have a job.  This 
is another matter that the GOC needs to rectify.  As of yet, the civilian sector has proven 
reluctant to assist with jobs.  This could be done by providing tax incentives to private 
companies that hire graduates.  But ex-Paras may have few incentives to look for work in 
the legitimate economy.  On the contrary, their familiarity with weapons and their 
knowledge of criminal organizations combines to make demobilized Paras attractive 
recruits for other criminal organizations.  In fact, in many areas where this training has 
occurred, new drug trafficking groups have begun to organize/emerge.66  An unproven 
but logical conclusion is that these groups are formed and manned by former Paras.  This 
rumor is only exacerbated by the fact that the GOC is reluctant to release current numbers 
of those still active in the program, raising suspicion that they lack the means to monitor 
allegedly demobilized Paras. 
Despite all of these faults, the reintegration program continues to function, 
although its overall success remains open to question.  The only thing that is certain is 
that, if the public sector does not accept the demobilized Paras back into society, the 
process will fail to meet its goals.  Public sympathy for former members of an illegal 
organization that constantly targeted civilians is low.  Additionally, competition for jobs 
between the unemployed citizens and former AUC members will only breed more public 
rejection and resentment towards them.   
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B.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE AUC DDR PROCESS 
Prior to fiscal year (FY) 2006, the U.S. Congress had prohibited any U.S. 
assistance for “former members of terrorist organizations.”67  Therefore, during the initial 
stages of the AUC DDR process, as stated in chapter three, U.S. assistance was limited to 
USAID monitoring and recording data at demobilization ceremonies.68  In 2005, the U.S. 
Congress declared that all assistance for demobilized members of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) would be contingent on the U.S. Secretary of State verifying the 
following: 
that assistance will be provided only to individuals who have verifiably 
renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement with  FTOs, and 
are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia Demobilization program, 
including disclosure of past crimes; the location of kidnap victims and 
bodies of the disappeared; and, knowledge of FTO structure, financing, 
and assets. 
that the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United States 
in extraditing FTO leaders and members who have been indicted in the 
United States for murder, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, and other 
violations of U.S. law; 
That the Colombian government is implementing a concrete and workable 
framework for dismantling the organizational structures of FTOs; and 
That funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals, and 
funds will only be available for any of the following activities; 
verification, reintegration (including training and education), vetting, 
recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations and 
prosecutions.69 
In 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State certified that the above conditions were met, allowing 
the U.S. Congress to pass the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of FY 2006.  This 
act has provided the GOC with $20 million to subsidize the AUC DDR process. In FY 
2007, the U.S. Congress once again allocated another $20 million for the demobilization 
and reintegration of FTO members.  Forty-million dollars spread over just two years is a 
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very significant amount, however, it pales in comparison to the $5.630 billion that the 
U.S. government has provided for Plan Colombia since FY 2000.70  Instead of focusing 
on cutting off sources of revenue for IAGs with programs such as the aerial eradication, 
U.S. assistance would be more effective if a greater percentage of the funding went to 
programs that assist the GOC in gaining control of its territory, like the reintegration 
phase of the DDR process. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Scandals and allegations of corruption of the political system have riddled the 
current DDR process and it is doubtful that it will ever regain the momentum that it had 
in 2004.  As Colombia will surely have to endure another DDR process in the future, 
what steps are should the GOC take to improve future processes?   
 
1. Dictate the Terms of Future Demobilizations 
As argued throughout this thesis, the GOC entered into negotiations with the 
AUC from a position of weakness.  Due to this fact, the terms found in the Ralito 
Accords and the Peace and Justice Law are overwhelmingly favorable to the AUC in the 
form pardons, limited jail terms, and amnesties with minimal or no reparations.  So, in 
order to prevent these circumstances from repeating themselves during future 
demobilization negotiations, the GOC needs to establish the proper conditions in order to 
have a strategic negotiating advantage.  These conditions virtually remove all other 
options from IAGs, besides the one to demobilize.  Strategies for setting the conditions 
must focus on how the GOC can regain control of the country over time, eventually 
forcing them to the negotiation table.  Although this approach should be implemented 
from existing urban areas under of state control, it can also be implemented in areas that 
have been turned over to the state following the DDR process.  This approach consists of 
two strategies.  The first focuses on securing the population and infrastructure.  The 
second focuses on targeting the illegal actors and their support network.  Although this 
may seem counter intuitive, the current GOC strategy of focusing primarily on attacking 
IAGs and their support structure is a proven failure.  As chapter four explains, this 
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approach is neither simple nor rapid.  It requires a drawn out, methodical, indirect attack 
on IAGs.  It limits their freedom of movement until they have no room to operate, thus 
forcing them to negotiate in earnest with the GOC.  Only when an IAG is cornered by the 
government will they, in earnest, conduct a legitimate DDR process.   
   
2.  Redefine Peace and Justice 
Future accords, and the subsequent laws derived from them, must be perceived as 
just by both the Colombian public and the international community.  Terms must also be 
in accordance with international standards for amnesties, pardons, reparations, jail terms, 
and other facets of a demobilization process.  In order to ensure this popular support, 
reparations from IAG organizations and their members, must be made prior to initiating 
any other incentive plan.  Additionally, the entire negotiation process must be 
transparent.  This will limit improprieties or the appearance thereof, such as the many 
mentioned throughout this thesis, from occurring.  International organizations should play 
a more active role in demobilization processes.  The GOC has been reluctant to allow 
international organizations to dictate the terms of demobilization agreements.  The GOC 
should drop opposition and leverage these international organizations against IAGs.  
Thereby, brining extra pressure to force them to adhere to the terms of agreed 
settlements.   
 
3. Reintegration  
Future reintegration programs must be better resourced.  This will require the 
GOC to think through the process, more accurately assess the numbers involved, 
calculate the political, social, and judicial implications of DDR for Colombian society, 
and put resources against those needs.  It may be difficult for a member of an illegal 
group to abandon a life of crime for low paying, legal employment.  Initially, the GOC 
must allocate sufficient financial resources to cover the pay differences.  In the long term, 
it must provide incentives to private sector employers to provide employment for these 
people.  With many private sector Colombian businesses paying monthly income taxes 
around 75%, tax cuts for employers of demobilized personnel could be the answer to the 
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lack of both funding and jobs.71   Utilizing tax deferments to fund and employ 
demobilized personnel, the reintegration phase of future DDR process will be more likely 
to achieve success.   
Protection of demobilized IAG members is another issue that must be 
addressed.  Preventing re-insertees from being slaughtered by other IAGs, similar to what 
the Unión Patriótica suffered during last decade, will not be an easy task.  While it is 
impossible for the government to provide personal security to each and every 
demobilized person, it must develop alternative solutions.  One short term one may be to 
provide secure housing areas.  A more comprehensive long term solution may be 
systematically to regain control of the country, one piece at a time, as explained in 
chapter four of this thesis.  Once areas come under government sponsored police and 
military control, wholesale slaughter may be less likely.  As there are no viable solutions 
to protecting ex-Paras at the moment, perhaps the best way for them to avoid becoming a 
target is to remain anonymous until better solutions are found.    
Unfortunately, personal protection and funding are not the only issues that 
challenge the reintegration of former members of IAGs.  Societal acceptance is a large 
part of the reintegration phase’s success.  As the DDR process is a closed system in a 
sense that one part cannot work independently without the other, each phase must 
synchronize with the others.  If a government begins negotiations from a position of 
weakness, it cannot dictate the terms of the agreements or the laws that will regulate the 
demobilization process.  Consequently, if reintegration is founded on unjust laws or is 
under resourced, the society may refuse to accept members back into the fold.  The GOC 
must learn from its mistakes so as to increase the successfulness of future DDR 
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